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Abstract Syringe exchange programs (SEPs) lower HIV
risk. From 1998 to 2007, Congress prohibited Washington,
DC, from using municipal revenue for SEPs. We examined
the impact of policy change on IDU-associated HIV cases.
We used surveillance data for new IDU-associated HIV
cases between September 1996 and December 2011 to
build an ARIMA model and forecasted the expected
number of IDU-associated cases in the 24 months follow-
ing policy change. Interrupted time series analyses (ITSA)
were used to assess epidemic impact of policy change.
There were 176 IDU-associated HIV cases in the 2 years
post-policy change; our model predicted 296 IDU-associ-
ated HIV cases had the policy remained in place, yielding a
difference of 120 averted HIV cases. ITSA identified sig-
nificant immediate (B = -6.0355, p = .0005) and slope
changes (B = -.1241, p = .0427) attributed to policy
change. Policy change is an effective structural interven-
tion for HIV prevention when it facilitates the implemen-
tation of services needed by vulnerable populations.
Keywords Structural interventions  Syringe exchange
programs  Health policy  HIV  Injection drug users
Introduction
The District of Columbia (DC) is in the midst of a sig-
nificant HIV/AIDS epidemic [1]. According to epidemio-
logical data from the end of 2011, approximately 2.4 % of
DC residents over the age of 12 years are living with HIV/
AIDS [1]. Injection drug use (IDU) accounts for 14.2 % of
the living cases of HIV/AIDS in the District [1]. HIV
transmission through IDU disproportionately affects
women and African-Americans, and the problem is most
common in Washington’s most economically disadvan-
taged areas. Among African Americans, IDU is the third
leading mode of transmission overall and the second
leading mode of transmission among women [1].
The scientific community has put increased attention on
the need for interventions that better address the social
drivers of HIV risk [2]. Structural interventions refer to
policies and programs that change environments in which
health risk occurs, but without attempting to change the
knowledge, attitudes, or other social interactions of persons
at risk [3]. Syringe exchange is an example of a structural
intervention that could have a tremendous impact on HIV
prevention among people who inject drugs (PWID).
Needle and syringe exchange programs (SEPs) (hence-
forth referred to as ‘‘syringe exchange’’ or SEP) are among
the simplest HIV prevention interventions for PWID, and
there is copious evidence of its effectiveness both domes-
tically and globally [4]. Expanded access to sterile injec-
tion equipment—particularly through SEP—has led to
decreased needle sharing among PWID and reduced HIV
incidence and prevalence [4–6], and is not associated with
increased crime rates or increased illicit drug use [7].
Modeling studies have shown that widespread syringe
access to active PWID for HIV prevention has societal
benefit and costs less than the estimated lifetime medical
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costs if those persons were to become HIV-infected
through shared injection equipment [8].
Challenges in Implementing Structural
Interventions
Historically, the allocation of municipal, state, or federal-
level funding for any public health intervention (including
SEP) is a decision governed by policy makers. Existing
laws must allow for the utilization of funds in a manner that
best addresses public health needs (e.g., supporting pro-
grams). Changes in legislation may be required before such
structural interventions can be implemented. These policy
changes—including the inclusion of seat belts in automo-
biles, implementation of smoke-free ordinances in build-
ings and public areas, and increases in alcohol taxation—
have been associated with significant improvements in
population level health [9–11].
Changing legislation for public health benefit is neither
simple [12] nor does it happen with any consistency or
frequency. In some cases, there may be a clear relationship
between the source of law and its jurisdictional application
(e.g., citywide smoking bans in restaurants that are limited
to a specific geographic jurisdiction). In other instances, the
relationships are not clear and may involve a combination
of federal, state, and local laws. The DC has a particularly
interesting legislative status because it is not recognized as
a state and, therefore, does not have the same autonomy as
other states in the Union. Instead, both Federal and local-
level legislation govern DC, and it is this disconnect
between Federal policy and city-level public health needs
that has fueled the HIV prevention struggle for the Dis-
trict’s PWID.
In 1998, the United States Congress included language
in the Financial Services Appropriations Bill proscribing
the use of federal funds for SEP. While this legislation did
not affect states and localities that wanted to use locally
generated revenue, it did affect the DC because of Con-
gress’ oversight of the city’s budget and operations through
the Financial Services legislation. Thus, while the DC had
a significant PWID population in need of HIV prevention
services, it was the only city in the US prohibited from
using municipal revenue to support syringe access. This
legislative restriction became known as the ‘‘DC Ban’’.
Prevention Works, a community-based organization (CBO)
supported through private donations and grants from non-
governmental charitable foundations, operated the only
SEP in the city. With the ban in place, Prevention Works
was limited in its ability to secure enough funding to
operate a program in a city that, at that time, had a gen-
eralized HIV prevalence of 3.0 % [13].
In December 2007, President George W. Bush signed
the 2008 Financial Services Bill (HR 2764) into law. This
version of the bill did not contain language prohibiting the
use of locally generated revenue to support syringe access
in the DC, thereby removing the DC Ban. Then-Mayor
Adrian Fenty allocated $650,000 to the DC Department of
Health to create the DC NEX, a program supporting several
CBOs in delivering a minimum harm reduction package
that includes syringe exchange, provision of condoms,
referrals to HIV testing and addiction treatment, and harm
reduction information [14].
The removal of the DC Ban is an instance in which a
natural policy intervention occurred. The purpose of this
study is to examine the impact of this policy change in
Washington, DC, on IDU-associated HIV cases. Analyses
were conducted to examine the actual number of new IDU-
associated HIV cases observed in DC following the
removal of the DC Ban and comparing it to the estimated
number of infections that would have occurred had the ban
remained in place. We then conducted a time series anal-
ysis to assess for changes in the numbers of pre- and post-
policy change cases of IDU-associated HIV infection. We
hypothesize that the lifting of the DC Ban will result in
significant impact on HIV cases in DC attributable to IDU-
exposure.
Methods
The impact of the removal of the DC Ban was examined in
two ways. Using autoregressive integrated moving aver-
ages (ARIMA) modeling, we first forecasted the expected
number of IDU-associated HIV cases if the DC ban had
remained in place and compared those to the observed
number of IDU-associated HIV cases in the 24-months
following the policy change. Subsequently, we used
interrupted time series analysis (ITSA) to investigate sig-
nificant immediate level and trend changes attributable to
the policy change. ITSA is a statistical method for ana-
lyzing temporally ordered data to determine if an experi-
mental manipulation or clinical intervention has produced a
reliable change in the data [15, 16]. ITSA allows the model
to account for baseline levels and trends present in the data
therefore allowing us to attribute significant changes to the
interruption, i.e., the lifting of the DC ban. All analyses
were completed using SAS version 9.3.
Our outcome measure for both analyses was IDU-as-
sociated HIV cases; these data were obtained from the DC
Department of Health’s HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, Sexually
Transmitted Diseases, and Tuberculosis Administration
(DC DOH HAHSTA). HIV cases were divided into
monthly observations of reported new cases of HIV attri-
butable to either IDU or MSM/IDU exposure between
August 1996 and December 2011. Due to peculiarities in
HIV infection and AIDS case surveillance and reporting in
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the DC Department of Health during the late 1990s and
early 2000s, new infections attributable to IDU exposure
are represented by new AIDS cases (from 1998 onward) as
well as new HIV cases (from 2001 onward).
Although the policy change that removed the DC Ban
was signed into law in December 2007, the actual imple-
mentation of the policy change—i.e., when the first clean
syringes were distributed through the newly created DC
NEX—did not occur until May 2008. Therefore, the date of
policy implementation rather than the date of policy change
serves as the interruption in our ITSA model. Monthly new
cases of HIV occurring prior to this implementation date
constitute the pre-policy change period (n = 141) and
those occurring after constitute the post-policy change
period (n = 44).
Using Box and Jenkins methods [17], an ARIMA model
was fitted to the pre-intervention period data. The best-fit
model was identified as (0,0,1) 9 (0,0,1)12. Using this
model, a forecast was created to obtain the number of IDU-
associated HIV cases that would have been expected in the
24 months following the interruption date had the policy
had not changed (May 2008–April 2010). The forecasted
values were then compared with the actual observed cases
during the same time period to calculate the number of
averted cases. Next, two variables were created to assess if
the implementation of the policy created a significant step-
change and/or a slope change attributable to the removal of
the DC Ban. The step-change was measured using a
dichotomous intervention variable which assigned a 0
value to pre-policy change observations and 1 to post-
policy change observations. The slope change was mea-
sured by creating a variable that assigned a 0 value to all
observations in the pre-policy change time period and a 1
value to the first observation after policy implementation,
but then increased the value by one in each subsequent
post-implementation month (i.e., 1, 2, 3,..44). Using the
model fitted to the pre-implementation period, both the step
and slope change variables were entered into the model for
the entire study time period as predictor variables.
Outliers with a\ .01 were identified and corrected in
the final model by adding them as input variables. Shift
outliers were corrected in the model by creating dichoto-
mous variables that assigned 0 to all observations occur-
ring prior to the outlier date and 1 to all observations
occurring after the outlier date. Additive outliers were
corrected in the model by creating dichotomous variables
assigning 0 to all observations other than the identified
outlier that was assigned the value of 1. During model
fitting, one shift and three additive outliers were added to
the model. Additive outliers were identified at June 1998,
July 2001, and June 2005, and a shift outlier was identified
at January 1999. All four outliers were significant within
the model.
This research was determined as being exempt from IRB
oversight.
Results
Figure 1 shows the number of cases of new HIV in DC
attributed to IDU by month. Visual inspection of the graph
indicates a decreasing trend in new cases of IDU-associ-
ated HIV infection across the pre- and post-policy time
period. The mean number of new infections attributed to
IDU exposure went from 19.06 mean cases per month to
5.82 mean cases per month, a 69.5 % decrease. This same
trend can be seen in both the IDU alone (16.33–4.45,
72.7 % decrease) and MSM/IDU (2.72–1.34, 50.7 %
decrease) categories of IDU-attributable exposure (see
Table 1).
Forecasting
Using the ARIMA model fitted to the pre-implementation
data, we developed a forecast of the number of expected
cases for each of the 24 months following the interruption.
This forecast reflects the number of cases that would have
occurred each month in DC had the policy not changed.
Surveillance data from the DC DOH reported 176 observed
IDU-associated HIV cases in the 2 years following the
repeal of the DC Ban. In contrast, the ARIMA model
predicted that 296 HIV infections would have occurred had
the policy remained in place. This contrast in actual versus
expected HIV infections is shown in Fig. 2. Thus, the
policy change allowing for municipal support of SEPs and
implementation of services in the DC that occurred based
on that policy change resulted in 120 averted HIV cases in
2 years.
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Fig. 1 Number of HIV cases attributed to IDU or MSM/IDU
exposure per month in DC between August 1996 and December 2011
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Epidemic Impact of Policy Change
Using the model fitted to the pre-implementation period,
both the step and slope change variables were entered into
the model for the entire study time period as predictor
variables (see Table 2). A significant immediate and per-
sistent step change (B = -6.0355, p = .0005) occurred in
the month following the lifting of the ban and there was a
significant reduction in slope across the post-implementa-
tion time period (B = -.1241, p = .0427).
Discussion
The findings of this research demonstrate that policy
change can serve as an effective structural intervention for
HIV prevention, particularly when changes in policy
facilitate the creation or scale up of prevention services
most needed by vulnerable and marginalized populations
such as PWID. Our modeling of the forecasted versus
actual epidemic curves shows that, as a result of the
removal of the DC Ban, there was a 70 % decrease in the
number of newly diagnosed HIV cases where reported
mode of transmission was IDU. This decrease is present
even after controlling for potential confounders, such as
seasonality, that may have affected individuals’ risk of
contracting HIV infection through injection drug use.
Moreover, this decrease is within the range of findings
from other studies that have examined the effects of syr-
inge access on blood borne infections. For example, in
Tacoma, syringe access was associated with a more than
80 % reduction in the incidence of hepatitis B and C
infections [18]. Similarly, syringe access was associated
with a 33 % reduction in HIV infection in New Haven, CT
[19], and a 70 % reduction in HIV infection in New York,
NY [20].
Although our forecasting only takes into account the
epidemic impact of the policy change in the 2 years fol-
lowing the removal of the DC Ban, the evidence of epi-
demic impact continues to be apparent as can be seen in the
ITSA which looks at the entire post-implementation period.
Table 1 New IDU-associated HIV cases prior to and following the removal of the DC Ban
Mean number of cases identified per month
Prior to policy change
(8/1996–4/2008)
Following policy change
(5/2008–12/2011)
Percentage change (pre- to
post-policy change period
New HIV cases attributed to IDU exposure 16.33 4.45 -72.7
New HIV cases attributed to MSM/IDU exposure 2.72 1.34 -50.7
Total 19.06 5.82 -69.5
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Fig. 2 Forecasted versus observed number of new HIV cases in DC
attributed to IDU exposure in the 24-month period following
implementation
Table 2 Interrupted time series
analysis of the impact of the
removal of the DC ban
Coefficients t value p value
Constant -.3312 -1.49 .1355
Baseline trend -.1351 -1.77 .0766
Seasonal trend .7140 10.95 \.0001
Additive outlier—June 1998 15.4411 3.39 .0007
Shift outlier—January 1999 -7.7512 -5.16 \.0001
Additive outlier—July 2001 12.6963 2.91 .0036
Additive outlier—June 2005 -11.7162 -2.66 .0078
Immediate effect of policy implementation -6.0355 -3.48 .0005
Change in trend post-policy implementation -.1241 -2.03 .0427
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A significant immediate and persistent drop in number of
monthly cases as well as a significant decrease in trend
over the 44 months following the policy implementation
indicates that the lifting of the DC ban continues to have a
significant impact on the number of IDU-associated HIV
cases that are observed in the city. One of the limitations of
ITSA as a methodology is that it does not allow for control
of threats to validity within the model. In order to explain
potential threats to validity, one must examine qualitative
or historical data to better contextualize the results of the
analyses. With regard to our ARIMA model, we observed
three additive outliers that occurred in June or July of
different years. These outliers are probably attributable to
increases in HIV testing (and, therefore, diagnoses of new
cases) that occurred around National HIV Testing Day,
which is held annually on June 27th. DC HAHSTA regu-
larly participates in National HIV Testing Day and these
outliers may represent years during which the DC DOH
made particularly aggressive pushes to increase testing in
the District. Similarly, the shift outlier observed in January
1999 may be an artifact of the HIV awareness events that
occurred in the DC around World AIDS Day 1998, which
featured remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
[21].
In addition to having important impact on health out-
comes like HIV infection, the removal of the DC Ban has
had positive impact on the cost of care for those diagnosed
with HIV. According to cost-effectiveness estimates by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the
average lifetime cost per HIV case in 2010 was 380,000
USD [22]. Therefore, averting an estimated 120 cases of
HIV infection translates to an approximate cost savings of
45.6 million USD for the DC. In the DC Appleseed Report
for 2011, it was reported that the city initially funded the
SEP at 650,000 USD for the fiscal year [23]. These funds
were awarded to local community providers who applied
through a grant program administered by the DC Depart-
ment of Health and were used for all aspects of operation,
i.e. staffing, clean syringes, mobile units for exchange
delivery, etc. The 650,000 USD amount did not change
over the next 2 years, which means that it cost the city
approximately 1.3 million USD to operate the citywide
SEP in the first 2 years, the same time period for which we
estimated the 120 averted HIV infections. Subtracting the
amount of the SEP operating costs from the total estimated
lifetime cost of treating 120 cases of HIV infection
decreases the overall savings to approximately 44.3 million
USD. This estimated cost savings does not take into
account the treatment of comorbid conditions (e.g., HCV
infection, mental health conditions, etc.), but it still attests
to the beneficial impact that availability and utilization of
harm reduction services can have for at-risk populations
such as PWID. Further, while over 91 % of DC residents
overall have insurance [24], coverage is not distributed
evenly and much of the burden of HIV treatment services is
absorbed by publicly funded programs. To that end, it
could be reasoned that the 44.3 million USD in savings is
money that is saved by taxpayers.
Another way of understanding the impact of the policy
change is to examine the impact that it had on the harm
reduction services provided in the District. While there are
no published reports on the exact number of syringes dis-
tributed in the 2 years prior to the implementation of the
policy change, we obtained information from the organi-
zational records and reports to funders of the sole SEP that
was in operation during the time of the DC Ban. Based on
these data, we estimate that in the two fiscal years prior to
the implementation of the DC NEX in May 2008, the
existing harm reduction service had distributed 180,000
clean syringes annually (personal communication,
Prevention Works Board of Directors). In comparison, in
FY 2009, the DC NEX reported exchanging approximately
314,000 syringes, providing 2,279 HIV tests, distributing
378,000 condoms, and linking 321 PWID to substance
abuse treatment [23]. While further analyses of these data
are outside the scope of this manuscript, they do show what
the increased investment in syringe access ‘‘buys’’ in terms
of actual services to the District’s PWID population.
This study had several important strengths and limita-
tions that must be noted. With regard to the latter, the main
limitation that we encountered was the quality of the
available surveillance data, particularly for the earlier years
of the study period on which we focused. As mentioned
previously, early surveillance data reflect only AIDS cases
whereas, after 2001, the data reflect both HIV and AIDS
cases. Another issue is that DC HAHSTA reports that
12.3 % of diagnosed cases of HIV/AIDS (n = 1974 cases)
have an unknown exposure risk [1]. For the purposes of
this study we must assume that these cases are evenly
distributed between each of the exposure risks. However,
given how marginalized PWID populations are in society,
it is possible that more than an even share of those with no
exposure risk information have infections attributable to
IDU. Lastly, because the DC did not adopt name-based
reporting until November 2006, reported cases in the
months before this may include duplicates. Data cleaning
has been undertaken by the DC DOH to identify and
remove as many duplicates as possible.
One of the major strengths of this study is that it is
examining the public health impact of a naturally occurring
policy intervention, i.e., the passage of Financial Services
bill HR 2764 without the syringe exchange funding
restriction (‘‘the DC Ban’’) for the DC. While this event was
not naturally occurring in the classic sense of the phrase
(e.g., natural disasters), it was an event that had the potential
to change—and did change—the risk environment for a
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population vulnerable to HIV infection in the DC. In that
regard, the removal of the Ban could be viewed as a policy
intervention for HIV prevention for PWID. Another strength
of this research is that using the ARIMA modeling allowed
us to control for potential confounding factors, such as
seasonality, that may have affected people’s HIV infection
risk. By being able to account for the potential impact of
these factors, we were able to predict with greater certainty
that the reduction in IDU-associated new HIV infections
was a result of the policy change and the programs that were
implemented as a result of that change.
One of the critical issues surrounding the study of policy
change as a structural intervention is that the potential
impact of any policy change is highly dependent on how
the new policies are implemented. For example, if the
removal of the DC Ban were not followed by the infusion
of funds by the DC City Government to create and
implement a SEP network, it is likely that there would have
been no tangible change in the actual availability of ser-
vices for PWID and, therefore, no impact on the numbers
of new infections associated with IDU. Similarly, it is
important to remember that policies governing local-level
operations may be overridden by policy changes at the
Federal-level. This point is particularly relevant for the DC,
which does not have the same autonomy as a state and
therefore is more vulnerable to the types of changes that
can occur when Congress authorizes legislation governing
how public health interventions (such as HIV prevention
efforts) can be implemented. Given the continued contro-
versial nature of syringe exchange in many localities, it is
important to understand that political processes affect the
implementation of this necessary HIV prevention service.
It is also important to document the evidence that supports
these policy changes so that these services can be main-
tained and reversals in policy can be prevented.
This research provides support for the adoption of a
more comprehensive and integrated approach to HIV pre-
vention that incorporates the influence of social, structural,
and policy-level factors as possible drivers of individual-
and community-level risk. In showing the epidemic impact
of policy change in the DC, our findings support the cre-
ation, promotion, and implementation of evidence-based
policy for HIV prevention. Creating policies that are sup-
portive of HIV prevention efforts can have substantial
benefit to individuals who are vulnerable to HIV/AIDS by
virtue of the environments in which they live.
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